



CHRONICLES OF WAR: RUSSIAN DEMORALIZATION ON THE FRONT LINES

Contents

About the Chronicles of War	1
Key takeaways	2
Russia's foiled special military operation.....	3
Misinformed and unprepared Russian forces	4
At least twelve trends stand-out.	4
A fast changing informational environment	8
About SecDev	11

15 March 2022

About the Chronicles of War

The Chronicles of War is an internal SecDev research initiative designed to assess the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine war during the first month of the war. Relying principally on open sources and key informant interviews in Ukraine and Russia, the focus is on three key areas:

- Security and safety of Ukraine's civilian nuclear infrastructure. The war in Ukraine is the first to occur within a country operating multiple civilian nuclear plants and countless civilian and medical facilities containing radiological materials.
- The cyber dimensions of the Ukraine conflict. Most conflicts now occur in five domains, including cyberspace. The escalatory use of cyberweapons could result in the invocation of NATO Article 5 provisions and pull more countries into the war.
- The perception of fighting by Russian soldiers and civilians. Successful war-fighting often depends on motivated and trained troops and a supportive public. Using digital methods to listen in on soldier conversations and assess wider public sentiment, it is possible to assess the strength, organization and effectiveness of Russia's war effort.

Russia's "short" special military operation in Ukraine risks turning into a "long" war. Most military analysts believe that Russia vastly overestimated the capacity of its armed forces to invade and occupy Ukraine. Russia has sustained substantial losses in the first three weeks of its campaign, potentially more than all US service-men/women in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars combined. Russian leadership made several strategic and tactical errors, though looks set to significantly ramp-up its military campaign. Yet as Russian losses accumulate, there is mounting evidence that demoralization among the rank and file is also setting-in. And Russian military morale has implications for the outcomes of the war and its aftermath. SecDev Group is tracking hundreds of social media reports and video testimony of captured Russian troops in Ukraine, including on social media platforms such as Telegram. A review of forced and voluntary confessions from a wide range of settings reveals at least 12 patterns and trends when it comes to Russian grievances. SecDev is cross-referencing individual testimonies with a dataset of over 150,000 soldiers released in March 2022 with future dispatches expected in the coming weeks.

Key takeaways

- A significant element of the Russian military was misinformed about the purpose of their activities on the Ukrainian border and were unaware about their duties until the very last possible moment.
- Russian soldiers were systematically misinformed about the socio-political situation in Ukraine, expecting to be met with open arms rather than active resistance.
- Russian soldiers were routinely misinformed about the aims and nature of the military operation in Ukraine during the opening weeks of the campaign.
- Russian troops were not ready for a military operation in Ukraine, many of them lacking appropriate training, experience and equipment.
- Russian prisoners of war claim to feel betrayed by their command and left to fend for themselves, including foraging in some instances for food and supplies in Ukraine.
- The Russian army suffered heavy losses in manpower and military equipment despite official claims to the contrary.
- There are documented cases of mass exodus and surrender in the Russian army, with information gathered from OSINT and exposed radios.
- The Russian armed forces may have been involved in perpetrating multiple war crimes from bombing hospitals to targeting civilians.
- Captured Russian soldiers are urging Russians to take to the streets in their own cities and demand an end to the war in Ukraine, though it is not clear to what extent these calls are made under duress.
- In Ukraine's LPR and DPR regions, ordinary civilians are being recruited and ordered to side with the Russian army.

Russia's foiled special military operation

There is widespread evidence indicating that Russia overestimated its military ability to win a quick war against Ukraine. Putin anticipated a rapid victory within days and the absence of serious resistance from Ukrainian forces and civilians. After three weeks, however, Russia's military campaign appears to have suffered from multiple strategic and tactical errors. Russia was not prepared to face the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces and militia, including citizens who joined in the territorial defense of their country.

Russian total combat losses / 14.03.2022			
		Ukrainian data*	Independent data**
	Military personnel	12000+	N/D
	Tanks	389	214
	APVs	1249	485
	MLRSs	64	23
	Air defense systems	34	33
	Military vehicles	677	412
	Artillery systems	150	144
	Aircrafts	77	13
	Helicopters	90	15
	UAVs	8	8
	Warships	3	N/D

* according to data published by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
 ** according to documented independent fact-checking data
<https://www.oryxploenikop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html>

Source: SecDev Group from Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

The Russian military's original intention was designed to overwhelm Ukraine's military infrastructure through a bombing campaign and limited specialized troop action to capture key cities and decapitate the country's civilian leadership. Western military analysts believe that Putin made several mistakes in over-estimating Russian preparedness, under-estimating Ukrainian and NATO capabilities and resolve, and failing to secure air supremacy and logistical support for ground troops. As a result, Russia has registered a series of painful losses in forces and assets that fall well short of Putin's original [plans](#). This is not to say that Russia will necessarily lose the war, especially given its vastly superior size and capabilities, but that Ukraine has a fighting chance of successfully resisting capture of key cities and decapitation of its leadership. SecDev Group has elsewhere detailed a [range of possible scenarios](#) moving forward.

Misinformed and unprepared Russian forces

A major challenge relates to Russia's under-preparation of its own soldiers, numbering close to 200,000 before the invasion on 24 February 2022. Most generals and virtually all troops were apparently unaware that they would be shifting from a training operation to a full-scale invasion, much less psychologically prepared to attack fellow Russian speakers in Ukraine. In addition to underestimating their adversaries and suffering from poor preparation, there appears to have been an over-reliance on units with limited capability and experience as well as under-serviced supply chains and equipment. All of these factors are undermining the morale of Russian military personnel which, in turn, compromises the military effectiveness of the Russian armed forces.

SecDev has detected evidence indicating the demoralization of significant segments of the Russian army participating in hostilities in Ukraine. During the first week of the war, SecDev identified hundreds of video, audio and social media files on sites such as Telegram demonstrating the extremely low morale among Russian servicemen. Although most testimonies were distributed by pro-Ukrainian information resources and channels, including ample footage of confessions of Russian prisoners of war (more than 150 prisoners of war were recorded), SecDev identified video evidence of the demoralization of Russian servicemen in situations where they were not coerced.

At least twelve trends stand-out.

First, a significant element of the Russian military was misinformed about the purpose of their activities on the Ukrainian border until the last possible moment. According to most testimonies of Russian prisoners of war, their military leaders concealed the (genuine) purpose of their training and military operations. Although it is possible that many soldiers assumed they could eventually be active in Ukraine, their military leadership assured them that they were participating in exercises to practice deterring a potential enemy attack. They were promised that following the exercises they would be returned to their places of permanent deployment (in Russia). Many captured soldiers said that they learned that they were participating in an attack literally minutes before their units were ordered to cross the border into Ukraine. Some claimed that they did not even know that they were on the territory of Ukraine because they believed that they were on a military march returning from the exercises, and found out their location only when they were fired upon and taken prisoner.

Second, Russian soldiers were systematically misinformed about the political and social situation in Ukraine. According to the testimony of Russian prisoners of war, many were informed that power in Ukraine was seized by nationalists, neo-Nazis and fascists who terrorized the Ukrainian population, especially in the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). They were also informed that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens were opposed to the current government of Zelensky. Many captured Russian soldiers begged their relatives, acquaintances and colleagues mistrust propaganda about the situation in Ukraine, claiming that ordinary peace-loving people live there and they did not meet any Nazis or fascists on the territory of Ukraine. These kinds of declarations were often made under duress, so the extent to which they can be believed must be treated with caution.

Third, Russian soldiers were routinely [misinformed](#) about the aims and nature of the military operation in Ukraine. According to testimonies of Russian prisoners of war, they were told that they were being brought into the territory of Ukraine in order to protect the population of the DPR and LPR from the genocide of Ukrainian nationalists, as well as to eliminate the fascist regime that had seized power in Kyiv. Their commanders gave assurances that they would not be met with serious resistance from the Ukrainian army and that the Ukrainian population would greet them as liberators. They were also promised that the so-called military operation would not last more than two or three days, and that their main task would be to advance deep into Ukraine and quickly take control of key Ukrainian cities. Some said they were told that the Ukrainian president Zelensky already signed the capitulation and they just needed to come to Kyiv to take control of the capital. Many captured Russian soldiers said they did not understand why they were sent to fight in Ukraine.

Fourth, Russian troops were not ready for a military operation in Ukraine. According to the testimony of Russian prisoners of war, the advanced units of the Russian troops that entered Ukraine in the first days of the war were provided with food, fuel and ammunition for a military operation for only two to three days. Command and control, logistics and timely provision of troops with necessary equipment were not thought out and implemented in advance. As a result, a large amount of military equipment was left without fuel and was subsequently abandoned right on the roads. The crews of military vehicles, tanks, and other types of weapons, left without fuel and supplies, lagged behind the main combat columns of the Russian army and were subsequently attacked or surrendered. There is considerable photographic and video evidence of abandoned Russian military equipment with no obvious damages. In addition, SecDev identified a [video](#) in which a Ukrainian citizen drives in his personal car along the highway in the Sumy region and speaks with Russian soldiers whose military vehicles stopped because they ran out of fuel. Russian soldiers say they do not know what to do next or where to procure fuel. SecDev also identified a [video](#) showing that Russian military units were given food rations that expired in 2015. Russian soldiers claimed that they were poorly equipped compared to Ukrainian counterparts, who had much better equipment and weapons.

Fifth, Russian prisoners of war say they were betrayed by their command and left to fend for themselves. According to the testimonies of Russian prisoners of war, they witnessed direct commanders abandoning their subordinates in battle or on the highway after they ran out of fuel. Some also feel betrayed by the top military leadership of Russia who were unable to provide emergency evacuation and assistance to military units coming under fire from the Ukrainian army. In their view, the military leadership of Russia simply used them as cannon fodder and left them to die in Ukraine. It is also indicative that

a large number of unprofessional conscript soldiers were sent to Ukraine, although Russian legislation prohibits the use of conscript soldiers in military operations on the territory of other states. President Putin and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation continue to [deny](#) the use of conscripts in the war in Ukraine. [Reportedly](#), all conscripts participating in the military operation in Ukraine were forced to urgently sign documents stating that they were voluntarily switching to a contract form of service (transferring to the status of professional soldiers). According to some [reports](#), soldiers are forced to sign contracts, and in some cases this is done retroactively or even without the consent of the soldiers themselves.

Sixth, the Russian army suffered heavy losses in manpower and military equipment. There is significant evidence of huge losses in manpower and military equipment of the Russian army. The Ukrainians [claims](#) that as of 13 March, the Russian army had suffered over 12,000 military casualties as well as huge losses of heavy weapons, fighter jets and helicopters. By way of contrast, the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Scott Berrier [put the estimate at](#) between 2,000 to 4,000 Russian fatalities (this was updated to 5,000-8,000 on 14 March). Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense at a briefing on March 2 [acknowledged](#) the death of just 498 soldiers. The heavy losses of the Russian army are likewise verified by independent researchers and organizations. For example, [according](#) to the oryxspioenkop.com project, the Russian army had lost over 1,000 pieces of military equipment including 170 tanks, 25 aircraft and helicopters, 30 air defense systems and hundreds of infantry fighting vehicles, cargo transport and artillery. [According](#) to US military intelligence, the Russian army has already been deprived by up to 10 percent of its military assets. Sizeable losses in personnel and military equipment are also recognized by captured Russian soldiers. In separate reports, soldiers stated that just a handful of their units survived the Ukrainian onslaught. There were also many reports that the Russian command does not care about the bodies of the dead.

Seventh, there are documented cases of mass exodus and surrender in the Russian army. According to some captured soldiers in the Russian army, there is very limited desire among the soldiers to fight in Ukraine. Many abandoned military equipment, scatter through the forests, or surrender at the first opportunity. SecDev found a [video](#) showing how a detachment of Russian military men returns on foot towards Russia, passing through a Ukrainian settlement. Judging by the comments of the inhabitants of this Ukrainian village and the answers of the Russian soldiers, it appears that Russian soldiers entered into negotiations with the inhabitants of this village and agreed that they would leave their military equipment and the Ukrainians would only allow them to leave if they agreed to return to Russia. SecDev also discovered an [audio recording](#) in which the allegedly 18th motorized rifle brigade of the “Wild Division” of the Russian Federation, consisting of Dagestanis and Chechens, massively refuses to comply with the order to attack Ukraine. The recording reveals how the brigade commander, presumably, scolds his subordinates, threatens them with a tribunal for failure to comply with the order, and promises to hand over everyone to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). At the same time, the soldiers express doubts about the need to go to Ukraine and do not understand why they need to die there. SecDev also located a [video](#) in which a Russian soldier communicates with local residents who offer him and his unit to surrender if they want to survive. Judging by the answers of the Russian soldier, he is not interested in the war and does not understand what he is doing in Ukraine and clarifies with the local residents the conditions for surrender.

Eighth, the Russian army appears to have been involved in perpetrating multiple war crimes. Some Russian captured soldiers during interrogations claim that the Russian army is committing war crimes by actually fighting civilians, destroying civilian infrastructure and bombarding Ukrainian cities, including

hospitals and schools for primary students. Several statements were also made that they were ordered to fire on civilians. One of the wounded Russian soldiers [said](#) that when their unit was ambushed, their officer gave the order to shoot civilians. When this soldier and his friend tried to take the civilians out of the shelling, they began to shoot at them. As a result, he was injured.

Ninth, captured Russian soldiers are urging Russians to take to the streets of their cities and demand an end to the war in Ukraine. During interrogations, captured Russian soldiers are often asked to call on their relatives and Russians to take to the streets to hold mass protests against the war in Ukraine. Given that such videos are filmed with the captives facing coercion, the authenticity of the sentiment needs to be treated with caution.

Tenth, in the LPR and DPR, ordinary civilians are massively recruited for the war on the side of the Russian army. SecDev located [video](#) footage featuring the interrogation of several dozen prisoners of war. The captured soldiers admit that they are residents of the eastern part of Ukraine (the so-called Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics that separated from Ukraine). Most of the prisoners stated that they were employees of one of the educational institutions in Donetsk (teachers, administrative and service personnel). They claim that they received an order from their director, under the threat of dismissal, to appear at the military training camp to participate in military exercises. After that, they ended up on the territory of Ukraine, where they were forced to take part in a military operation.

Eleventh, many Belarusian soldiers are apparently refusing to take part in the war in Ukraine. SecDev located a series of messages related to the discussion of the possibility of participation of the Belarusian armed forces in the war in Ukraine. It is clear that the territory of Belarus is being used by Russia for a military operation in Ukraine.

From the territory of Belarus, Russia has sent its troops into the northern part of Ukraine and is also supporting a group of troops moving towards Kyiv. Belarusian hospitals and morgues in cities bordering Ukraine are receiving wounded and killed Russian soldiers. In addition, there are several Russian military bases on the territory of Belarus from which Russian military aircraft take off and launch missile attacks on the territory of Ukraine. Although the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko [stated](#) that there is not a single Belarusian soldier or Belarusian weapon in Ukraine, pro-Ukrainian information channels periodically feature reports on their participation, though these have yet to be independently verified. Meanwhile, pro-Ukrainian social media channels [published](#) reports that most Belarusian soldiers refuse to participate in the military operation in Ukraine, and a post was published allegedly with a copy of the statement of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, who submitted his resignation due to his inability to form combat units owing to the mass refusal of Belarusian military personnel. The Ministry of Defense of Belarus [denied](#) this information, indicating that it was another fake report. The Ministry of Defense of Belarus released a [propaganda video](#) in which Belarusian servicemen tell their mothers not to worry and that they are not participating in the military operation on the territory of Ukraine and ask them not to believe any fake news.

Twelfth, there are signs of strong resistance within Belarus to participate in the Ukrainian conflict. President Lukashenko, despite pressure from Putin, appears to be resisting sending Belarusian armed forces to the war in Ukraine. According to local [polls](#), 98 percent of the population of Belarus does not support the idea of its participation in the war. Similar sentiments appear to reign in the Belarusian army. The theme of war is especially sensitive for the Belarusians that lost a third of the population during the Second World War. Ensuring peace in Belarus was part of

Lukashenko's political credo. He routinely claimed that no matter how bad the situation in the country, under his leadership he prevented war in Belarus. Meanwhile, Lukashenko cited Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Russia as examples of "failure", in which armed conflicts occurred. Lukashenko is unlikely to agree to the participation of Belarusian soldiers, as this would threaten his support from the wider public and elites, including raising the spectre of mass protests. More importantly, he could lose confidence from the military and security forces that have supported Lukashenko since mass protests threatened to unseat him in August 2020.

Overall, these factors are contributing to the demoralization of many Russian soldiers. Conscripts, non-professional soldiers, appear to be particularly demoralized. These are 18-20 year old people who were drafted into the Russian army and have no professional experience in combat operations. One of the most revealing [videos](#) identified by SecDev shows a detachment of several dozen Russian military personnel hiding an agricultural building in the countryside. In the video, soldiers and officers say that they have already been hiding out for several days, that they have been abandoned by their command, that they have not eaten for days and do not know what to do next. They reported that they are trying to contact the Russian command to be evacuated back to Russia, but they receive nothing but empty promises. The video was filmed by Russian servicemen themselves, not in Ukrainian captivity, some of them armed. Another indicator of the low morale of the Russian army are cases of looting by Russian military personnel. SecDev identified videos [showing](#) repeated [looting](#) in [Ukrainian stores](#), as well as videos of Russian soldiers trying to hack into an [ATM](#) and rob a [Ukrainian church](#).

A fast changing informational environment

SecDev is continuously monitoring the physical and digital dimensions of conflict in Ukraine and it is important to underline that video footage must be treated with caution. During the first three weeks of the campaign, SecDev found that all parties involved in the conflict have carried out information operations and countermeasures. Tactics involve exaggerating enemy losses and underestimating domestic losses as well as active dissemination of fake news and rumors. SecDev repeatedly encountered situations where a single event is presented in utterly different ways by pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian channels. Indeed, research is being carried out in conditions of massive and disorientating information flows, where thousands of messages and publications are published hourly from all sides of the conflict. Although SecDev attempts to verify the authenticity of the evidence recorded, it is difficult to review all messages.

Notwithstanding the deluge of information, it important to stress that there is limited reliable publicly available evidence about the morale of Russian military personnel voluntarily generated by troops themselves on social media channels or in public pages, groups or chats. What is available is generally restricted to the accounts of individual Chechen military personnel sent to Ukraine, and who, apparently, were given the appropriate carte blanche for propaganda activities. Rather, the successes of the Russian army and the fighting spirit of Russian soldiers are covered in the channels of so-called pro-Russian military correspondents, who also pass everything through the sieve of Russian propaganda.

The lack of reliable information emanating voluntarily from Russian soldiers themselves may seem odd, but this could be due to the fact that they do not have the appropriate opportunities, venues or vectors for communication. There is significant evidence indicating that immediately prior to the invasion, personal use mobile phones were confiscated from Russian military personnel. And while all phones could not be seized, their use on the territory of Ukraine with Russian SIM cards could be limited, since after the invasion, the Ukrainian authorities limited the possibility of using Russian SIM cards in the networks of Ukrainian mobile operators. Russian soldiers may also resist sharing their views on social accounts or public pages because of the threat of disciplinary and criminal punishment from the Russian command. They may be reluctant to be held accountable for disseminating disinformation or information discrediting the honor of the Russian army, or revealing geolocation data on the deployment or movement of Russian troops.

The information environment is also becoming more constrained in recent weeks owing to the ramping-up of Russian censorship. The State Duma of the Russian Federation [adopted](#) a law criminalizing the dissemination of any “fake” news about the actions of the Russian armed forces (with a potential criminal offence of up to 15 years in prison). Since the introduction of the law, SecDev observed a sharp shift in the tone and tenor of the coverage of events in Ukraine across many Russian channels, sharing propaganda or otherwise. Before the adoption of the law, there was a modicum of objectivity in the coverage of the war in pro-Russian channels (e.g. there were publications, photos and videos of damaged Russian equipment and the corpses of Russian soldiers). Following the adoption of the law, however, such publications are practically non-existent.

There is mounting [evidence](#) that against the backdrop of the aggravation of the military conflict in Ukraine, the relatives of Russian soldiers do not have the opportunity to clarify their location, as well as whether they are healthy and alive. [Panic is growing](#) among Russian mothers whose children have been drafted into the army due to the information vacuum and the fear that their children will be sent to war. At the same time, it should be taken into account that in Russia, activities related to the provision of legal assistance to military personnel and members of their families are currently severely limited. Previously, one of the key organizations that provided, among other things, legal assistance to conscript soldiers was the [Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia](#). For thirty years, this organization has been protecting the interests of soldiers - conscripts and their mothers, ensuring the legal protection of soldiers, including in the instances of arbitrariness and violence in the Russian army.

However, in October 2021, the FSB [adopted](#) a regulation that effectively prohibited the collection of any information about the Russian army. In particular, a ban was established on the collection of information which can be used against the security of Russia. This includes information “on the deployment of the army”, “on the observance of the law and the moral and psychological climate in the troops”, as well as “on the progress and results of consideration of reports of crimes in the army”. For collecting such information, a person can be entered in the register of “foreign agents” and be liable up to criminal liability. As a result of the adoption of this normative act, the activities of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers was [paralyzed](#). The organization has been unable to collect data and accept applications from military personnel since October 2021 and, as a result, is unable to carry out human rights activities. Currently, its activities are reduced to the format of an information service

- they provide telephone addresses of the Ministry of Defense and military units, which relatives of soldiers who are trying to find their loved ones should contact.

The vast majority of evidence related to the demoralization of Russian troops is distributed via pro-Ukrainian channels. Testimonies are usually featured through widely shared videos with interrogations of captured Russian soldiers and militias called-up from Donbas. In these videos, captured Russians are prompted to explain how they ended-up in Ukraine proper, what orders they carried out and how they were captured. They routinely apologize for their deeds, urge their colleagues to refuse to participate in the war, ask their mothers to contact military units and various organizations with requests to assist in their release from captivity, and also say that they were betrayed by their officers and the high command of Russia.

Although these videos contain significant information - including personal data of prisoners and commanders of their units, names and numbers of military units, addresses of their deployments - it is not clear from the videos themselves how much captured Russian soldiers are genuinely sincere. SecDev cannot rule out that the fact of being a prisoner of war, facing considerable psychological or physical pressure under interrogation, can shape the nature of information being provided. Even so, SecDev reviewed hundreds of videos of interrogations of Russian prisoners of war recorded filmed in different locations, under different circumstances and by different people. The testimonies of Russian soldiers are often similar in their content and format, explaining how they got to Ukraine, how they were captured and how demoralized they are. The variety of sources and the similarity of testimonies of Russian prisoners of war on certain facts and the circumstances of their stay in Ukraine can be assessed as an indirect confirmation of the reliability of the information they contain.

Another factor that could confirm the authenticity of the video evidence of captured Russian soldiers is how the nature of videos with prisoners has changed over time. During the first days of the war, most captured Russian soldiers testified with their eyes sealed with adhesive tape with hats or plastic bags pulled over their eyes (apparently so that prisoners could not determine their location and, in case of escape, reveal the location of Ukrainian units). However, more recent videos are being recorded with the faces of the prisoners exposed, in order to make it easier to identify them.

Finally, a growing number of publications have recently appeared in pro-Ukrainian channels with screenshots of the correspondence of Russian soldiers with their relatives or friends in Russia, which were photographed from the phones of captured or killed Russian soldiers, as well as audio recordings of conversations that were allegedly intercepted by Ukrainian special services. In general, the narratives of the correspondence and audio recordings of conversations published in this way echo the narratives voiced by captured Russian soldiers during interrogations. Even so, it is virtually impossible to verify the authenticity of such screenshots and audio recordings.

About SecDev

SecDev is an agile research and innovation firm helping clients navigate digital-geopolitical, geospatial and geodigital risk. SecDev builds value through innovation in strategic foresight, data science and urban analytics. SecDev's team is fluent in technology, global in scope and results-oriented. SecDev empowers clients, such as national governments, technology companies and international organizations, to make informed choices that deliver value in the digital-urban age.



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